Solutions of strategic games under common belief of sure-thing principle
- Publication Type
- Contribution to conference
- Authors
- Trost, Michael
- Year of publication
- 2009
- Published in
- Proceedings of the 12th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
- Pubisher
- ACM , New York
- ISBN / ISSN / eISSN
- 978-1-60558-560-4
- DOI
- 10.1145/1562814.1562847
- Page (from - to)
- 247-256
- Conference name
- Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge Conference XII
- Conference location
- Stanford University
- Conference date
- 06.07.2009 - 08.07.2009
In this paper we address the issue which solution concept for strategic games is consistent to common belief that each player satisfies the sure-thing principle. Traditional epistemic analysis takes for granted that there is common belief that each player acts according to some expected utility function. Because our presumptions are milder than the traditional ones we are forced to modify the traditional epistemic approach and follow the idea of Morris (1996) to fasten the beliefs of the players to their preferences. One central finding of our paper is that common belief of sure-thing principle plus state-independence characterizes the solution concept proposed by Börgers (1993).